



Washington, D.C. 20505

22 November 2019

Ms. Emma Best
MuckRock News
DEPT MR 60711
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2018-02556

Dear Ms. Best:

This is a final response to your 13 April 2018 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the following records: **copies of AA 1954, AA 1954 through 1957, AA 1957 to 1960, and AA 1958 onward, as described on page 16 of C02754356.** We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3141, as amended.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located one document which we determined can be released in its entirety. A copy of the document is enclosed at Tab A.

We also determined that six documents can be released in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). Please be advised that we conducted a thorough and diligent search in an effort to locate a full text version of C00394117 but unfortunately were unsuccessful. Although our searches were reasonably calculated to locate the relevant document, and it is highly unlikely that repeating those searches would change the result, you nevertheless have the legal right to appeal the finding of no full-text version of the document responsive to your request. Therefore, we are enclosing a copy of the document as previously reviewed and copies of the remaining documents at Tab B.

Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statutes are Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 90 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.


Please be advised that you may seek dispute resolution services from the CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or from the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) of the National Archives

and Records Administration. OGIS offers mediation services to help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies. Please note, contacting CIA's FOIA Public Liaison or OGIS does not affect your right to pursue an administrative appeal.

To contact CIA directly or to appeal the CIA's response to the Agency Release Panel:	To contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) for mediation or with questions:
Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Information and Privacy Coordinator (703) 613-3007 (Fax) (703) 613-1287 (CIA FOIA Public Liaison / FOIA Hotline)	Office of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphi Road – OGIS College Park, MD 20740-6001 (202) 741-5770 (877) 864-6448 (202) 741-5769 (Fax) ogis@nara.gov

If you have any questions regarding our response, you may contact the CIA's FOIA Hotline at (703) 613-1287.

Sincerely,



Mark Lilly
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Tab A



SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 DEC 1953

Mr. Allen Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Since my conference with you on 17 December, I have discussed the subject of "Agreed Activities" with members of my staff. The major Army commanders and I are of the opinion that the real need is for a clarification of NSCID #5 and not an "Agreed Activities" paper.

As you know, the proposed agreement has as its basis NSCID #5 and if consummated would be corollary thereto. It now appears that many officials in the intelligence community believe events have overtaken the basic policy reflected in NSCID #5 and that this directive is out of date, as well as focus, with the realistic demands for military intelligence collection today. I appreciate your viewpoint that the Army should continue to make whatever contribution it can in the clandestine collection field. I believe the Army can contribute even more, but the language of NSCID #5 has often served to hinder rather than assist this effort because of the varied interpretations thereof, the provisions of NSCID #2, and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947.

The need for coordinated operations to avoid inadvertent compromise and unprofitable duplication is perfectly clear to me. A possible device to effect clandestine coordination would be the exchange on a reciprocal basis of experienced personnel at appropriate command levels should NSCID #5 be revised so as to define the responsibility and the fields in which the Military Services and CIA would operate in clandestine collection.

Furthermore, in effecting coordination at the National level, I believe that the IPC would be the acceptable mechanism to be used by the representative members of the intelligence community. This would require some revision of the IPC charter.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S D 2011
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HQ IG-2
DATE: 18 MAR 1981 REVIEWER: 064540

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Page 1 of 2 pages

Copy to Vital Documents - Approved for Release: 2019/09/18 C03094388 Copy 1 of 5 copies

Tab B

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3 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Notes for Briefing of "The Task Force on Intelligence Activities", (i.e., Clark Group)

As you only have thirty minutes for this preliminary exercise, it is suggested that you touch lightly on items A and D and utilize most of your time on items B and C.

Legislative Basis**A. National Security Act of 1947.**

The National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency were both established by the National Security Act of 1947. The Act provided that the CIA should:

1. Coordinate the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies.
2. Correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security.
3. Advise the NSC concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security.
4. Make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence activities.
5. Perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 5/5/92

HRP 89-2

C10246

The legislative basis for covert operations and for espionage and counter-espionage is found in the above provisions. The National Security Council issued various Intelligence Directives to implement the provisions of the Act.

Implementing Directives

B. National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 5.

In December of 1947, the NSC issued NSCID 5 -- the first of the directives to CIA bearing on clandestine operations. NSCID 5 is the basic document that authorizes and directs espionage and counter-espionage operations. It directs the DCI to conduct all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage outside the U.S. and its possessions, except for certain agreed activities conducted by other departments and agencies. These activities pertain to the conduct of espionage and counter-espionage by the military services for the express purpose of protecting their organizations when located in foreign territory.


This Directive (NSCID 5) makes DCI responsible for:

- 1. Coordinating covert and overt collection of intelligence.**
- 2. Coordinating the use of casual agents employed by other IAC agencies with the organized covert activities.**
- 3. Disseminating intelligence information to other agencies.**
- 4. Coordinating espionage and counter-espionage with the senior U.S. representative and informing the senior military commander in general of clandestine collection activities conducted in or from an occupied area.**
- 5. Planning service support of espionage and counter-espionage projects jointly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**
- 6. Placing CIA personnel who are conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations in an active theaters of war under the direct command of the theater commander.**

**C. NSC 5412 - Basic Charter for Covert Operations.
(Political, Psychological and Paramilitary)**

In the latter part of 1947 the NSC had been deliberating on the possibility of supplementing its overt foreign activities with covert measures. These deliberations were translated into action when Czechoslovakia fell to the Communists and we had no means to prevent it, and when the Italian elections of 1948 were barely salvaged by a series of impromptu political operations. Thus, on 18 June 1948, the NSC directed that a new office be created within CIA to plan and conduct covert operations; and, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime. The initiation of U.S. covert operations in time of "peace" was a landmark in U.S. National policy.

A covert operation is one so planned and executed that U.S. responsibility for it is not evident, and, if uncovered, the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility.



NSC 5412, dated 15 March 1954 is our basic charter. This paper states that covert operations will be used to support U.S. foreign and military policies, will be consistent with such policies and that they must be conducted in such a manner that any such operation can be disclaimed by this Government. NSC 5412 requires that covert operations be correlated with all espionage and counter-espionage operations of this Government under the overall control of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Prior to September 1953 we received our guidance for the conduct of covert operations from representatives of the Departments of Defense and State, and at times and to a lesser degree from the former Psychological Strategy Board. We now receive our principal guidance through the newly established Operations Coordination Board, of which our Director is a member.

Coordinating Agreement with Defense

D. Command Relationships Between the CIA Organization and the Armed Forces in Active Theaters of War Where American Forces are Engaged.

This paper is an agreement approved by DGI and JCS which establishes CIA's relationship with the military services in war. Five of its principal features are:


1. In active theaters of war or in other areas where U.S. Forces are engaged in combat operations, CIA (forces) retain their organizational integrity.

2. The exercise of control by CIA over CIA Forces, corresponds to that of the military services over their respective component forces as set forth in the document pertaining to "Joint Action of the Armed Services."

3. The authority of Theater Commander over CIA Forces in his theater corresponds to that which he exercises over military forces assigned to his command.

4. CIA operations which have delicate political or diplomatic implication will be conducted independently under the control of the DGI. Such operations within, mounted from, or staged through theaters of war, will be coordinated with the JCS. Theater Commanders will be informed and the necessary military support will be assured by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5. Independent unconventional warfare operations conducted by JCS Commanders will be coordinated with CIA.



1C 120 B/A

Letter From ⁵the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Assistant Chief of Staff
(G-2) of the Army (Trudeau)

Washington, January 25, 1954.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Job 95G00278R, Box 1,
Folder 27. Secret. Drafted by ⁹~~CAT/ROM/RQ~~ [✓] CIA's Foreign Intelligence Staff on January 4, 1954. Rewritten
by DDCI: CPCabell on January 22, 1954. A legal opinion by CIA General Counsel

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(b)(3)

Lawrence Houston was found in the same folder.

^{To DCI Dulles;}
2 Not printed, (ibid, Folder 24.)
⁶

3 Document . NSCIDs, April 28, 1951

4 Document . NSCIDs, August 28, 1951

5 Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6 Printed from a copy that indicates Dulles signed the letter.

120 b/1
ER 5-0459

JAN 25, 1954

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Trudeau:

In your letter of 24 December 1953 you suggested that problems relating to clandestine intelligence required a clarification of NSCID #5 rather than an "Agreed Activities" paper. ✓ 2 ✓ 3

NSCID #5 is a fundamental statement of policy. Prior to its issuance the underlying philosophies and problems were debated at length at all levels in the interested offices of the Executive Branch of the Government and by appropriate congressional groups. Each formal study of the problem of clandestine intelligence operations, after debate of the various views presented, came without exception to an acceptance of the principles reflected in NSCID #5. ✓ 4

A revision was issued on 28 August 1951 to meet new conditions arising from the Korean War and the establishment of NATO, but the paper as revised is still a statement of basic responsibilities rather than an attempt to spell out the conditions that will govern all conceivable relationships and circumstances. There is, however, ample flexibility in the concept stated in NSCID #5 to meet all such circumstances, and changing needs can best be met by corollary agreements, based on NSCID #5, which can be readily achieved without calling into play the full machinery of the National Security Council, which inevitably would require a rather prolonged procedure.

CM ER 95-600278R

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Therefore, rather than seek a change in NSCID #5, I would prefer to pursue the problem of a coordinated program on the basis of the "Agreed Activities" paper which representatives of the Armed Services prepared in collaboration with representatives of this Agency, in June of last year. We are now awaiting with interest the return of this draft agreement which I understand the JIC ad hoc committee dealing with this problem planned to rework on the basis of comments from commanders in the field. ✓

I would therefore urge that you use your influence to bring about early resumption of negotiation leading to a final "Agreed Activities" paper.

Sincerely,

(Signed) 6

Allen W. Dulles ✓
Director

C/FI/RQM/RQ, eg (4 Jan 54)
REWTN: DDCI/CPCabell/VL (22 Jan 54)
Distribution:

- orig & 1 - addressee
- 2 - DCI
- 1 - DD/P
- 1 - C/PPC
- 1 - C/RQM/RQ
- 1 - RI/FI
- 1 - CPC Chrono
- 1 - AD/IC
- 1 - General Counsel
- 1 - Vital Documents ✓

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16 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, DD/P**SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities**

1. In accordance with your request I have gone over Appendix II of the Task Force Report and I have discussed the matter with C/I&R. We are of the opinion that there is no objection, in fact it might be entirely to our advantage if we would be willing to take the initiative and provide the Department of Defense extracts from Appendix II which refer to them.
2. The first sixteen pages of this Appendix is background and history taken almost entirely from a paper prepared by the PPC Staff in 1953. There is no need to send any part of this section to the Department of Defense as it does not pertain directly to them.
3. The next two sections of the report covering from pages sixteen to twenty-eight pertain to psychological warfare and political warfare. There is nothing in these sections pertaining to the Department of Defense.
4. The next section pertaining to paramilitary (pages twenty-eight to thirty-three) relates to the Department of Defense and could be referred to them.
5. Selected parts of the section regarding foreign intelligence (pages thirty-three to thirty-nine) which relates to the Department of Defense could be extracted and furnished Defense.
6. The section on the defector program (pages thirty-nine to forty-two) could be given to Defense in toto.
7. The remainder of the report does not concern the Department of Defense.
8. Recommendation:

a. That the Clandestine Services offer no objection to furnishing to General Erskine's office, Department of Defense,

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the extracts of Appendix II of the Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities which refer to them.

- b. That other sections of the CIA report (DD/S, DD/I, etc.) be extracted and furnished in a similar manner.
- c. That CIA officially request the parts of the Department of Defense Task Force Report which refer to this Agency.
- d. That after the exchange of information has been made that we sit down with the proper people in Defense and resolve the facts, thus limiting any extensive discussion at OCB, PB, or NSC levels.

Signed J. D. BALMER

J. D. BALMER
Chief, Planning and Program
Coordination Staff

Attachment:

Attached hereto are additional extracts from the DOD report which give a better idea of the scope of this proposed undertaking.

DD/P-PPC/JDBalmer/mlh

Distribution:

- COP - Copies 1 & 2
- C/I&R - Copy 3
- C/WPD - Copy 4
- C/PPC - Copy 5 & 6 of 7
- TSCO - Copy 7 of 7 copies

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NOTES TAKEN FROM THE
TASK FORCE REPORT
CN
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MAY 1985

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- Page VI - Complaint of security restriction imposed by CIA. Recommend no legal restrictions in future.
- Page XXIII - 1st Hoover Report (1948) said excess of adm. personnel. This report says it still exists (excess) but due to number of buildings and compartmentation.... (Task force apparently accepts fact that some improvement has been made.)
- Page XXV - Comment on the Command Relationships paper which evolved since 1st Report (1948). The committee feels that due to seriousness of the problem continued study should be made to solve problem, to reach the best possible solution, prior to outbreak of war. (This indicates further solution required.)
- Page XXV - 1st Report (1948): Military do not reveal enough to (CIA?) on grounds of security. This report says situation is not solved.
- Page XXVIII - Comment favorably on quality (CIA) improvement of scientific and medical intelligence -- handicapped because of inability of all intelligence community to operate in bloc.
- Page XXIX - CIA not contaminated -- good security risk -- Dulles commented on favorably but report states he has taken upon himself too many operational tasks. Certain admin. flaws have developed in CIA which must be corrected.
- Page XXIX - Task force deeply concerned over lack of adequate intelligence data from behind curtain. Aggressive leadership and boldness is essential in order to get the info.
- Page XXX - Majority of task force convinced internal reorganization of CIA is necessary to insure primary and vital functions are discharged without diversionary interests interfering with primary responsibility.
- Page XXX - Recommend watch-dog commission (Joint Congressional).

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"... G-2 operates generally in a healthy atmosphere of cooperation with the other Agencies in the intelligence community. The only areas of disagreement which currently exist stem from the prescriptions contained in certain directives of the National Security Council. . . ."

Page 118: "There are certain attitudes taken by some Agencies which have a tendency to interfere with this overall effort, however, and these are evidenced in an over extension of the 'need-to-know' criteria. If this criteria could be given a 'need-to-know-all' connotation, a fuller degree of mutual understanding would result Having a source which has certain capabilities should be a matter of common knowledge within the community."

Page 124: "The Army is definitely not satisfied with this agreement (Agreed Activities) only accepting the terms as the best obtainable solution at this time."

Pages 124, 125, 126 are devoted to the

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(b)(3)

Page 125: Conclusions:

"The Army has a responsibility under Section 102 (4) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and also under the provisions of NSCID 1, to engage in clandestine activities. The NSCID 5 therefore is in effect a denial of the Army's capability and statutory authority in this respect. The 'Agreed Activities' paper is only a partial recognition of this responsibility and does not fully permit the Army to meet the requirements of this responsibility or the exigencies of the situation. "... The Army has a very extensive capability for further exploiting the defector program but is prevented from doing so by the implementation of the provisions of NSCID 13 which relate especially to the inducement aspect of that program."

Page 127 - Recommendations:

That the NSC revise NSCID 5 to provide for clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the military services consistent with their

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capabilities and statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947.

" That the implementation of NSCID 13 be extended to permit participation in the Soviet and Satellite Defector Inducement Program by the military services and CIA in direct proportion to the capabilities of each."

U. S. NAVY REPORT

- Page 145: NSCID/1 requires CIA to furnish collected info of concern or interest to another agency to service attache or other local intell. rep. in the area. Reported to task force that in some areas this procedure is not being fully implemented.
- Page 146: Effect of Naval Blockade (China). Navy & Army have parview in the field. State and CIA are also furnishing info on this. Estimates of Navy and Army should be considered paramount; under terms of National Security Act of 1947 and NSCID/1, CIA will not duplicate intell. activities of various departments but will use department intell.
- Page 154: Navy jealous of its prerogatives in intell. field. Several cases cited where CIA duplicated work of primary interest to Navy particularly guided missiles and transportation in Far East.

AIR FORCE

- Page 179: Recommendation: Intell. Research Center be established under CIA to guide the total intelligence research program. (Makes note of Air Force research in this field.)

COVERT OPERATIONS

Department of Defense

- Page 183: JSCAP 1954 - Approved by Joint Chiefs in 1954 (June). No consultation or referral to CIA was effected until it was approved by JCS.

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- Page 184:** CIA responsible for preparing a base for H&H and UW. "So far as JCS know, this is not being done in areas now under Soviet or Satellite control." Theater commanders and certain other members of Army and Navy planning staffs in Washington must know current status of assets in order to plan intelligently. The knowledge is not now available to pertinent military staffs in Washington.
- Page 184:** Army member of JCS directed realistic estimate of guerrilla potential behind curtain for D/Day and D/ 6 months up to 24th month.
- Each of Iron Curtain countries report was 0 "which indicates lack of info on part of commander (Theater) or of action on part of CIA." Army much concerned because JSCAP says "GW will be used to the maximum from D-Day onward."
- Page 186:** "In spite of accomplishments of Inter-Agency Priorities Committee, Army is concerned over the lack of info from the CIA as compared to its own collection achievements in certain areas."
- Army wants restraining directives lifted believing it could collect more info in Europe. Confidence because Army type info is more easily obtainable than that which CIA is trying to collect.

DEFECTION

- Page 188:** Army satisfied with wording of directives in field of defection inducement. Not satisfied with present lack of inducement policies. Defectors lost because Army unable to give assurance of asylum or other appropriate inducements due to CIA unwillingness to grant Army authority to make such offers.
- Page 188:** "The inducement feature and CIA's failure to keep Army member of the Inter. Def. Committee and its supporting committees overseas adequately and promptly informed are the two most important problems in the defector program as far as Army is concerned."
- "There have been instances in which CIA has denied the Army knowledge of or access to defector in CIA custody." CIA says these people have double agent value. Defectors are great source of all kinds of info and Army does not agree with CIA in this field.

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Page 190:

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(b)(3)GW

Army assigned "Primary Interest" of all services for GW.

Page 193: Grave concern expressed by Army that Theater Commanders are not informed by CIA of UW assets and planned operations; concern based on --

"Meagerness of assets set forth in plan submitted by the theater commanders in accordance with JCS instructions."

"Complete lack of info on part of staff at Washington level charged by JCS with staff supervision of and planning for this type of war."

Page 194: Makes reference to fact that EUCCOM has dragged military feet in providing CIA with targets to be covered. These initial requirements of war so huge it couldn't be filled - (Take off of Erskine statement). (This has to do with special forces and assistance to S. P. by CIA.)

DEPT. OF NAVY

Page 194-5: Intelligence Collection: Sent "agreed activities" to field, in addition sent instruction to direct efforts to development of E&E info and provision for assistance in coastal areas where evaders or escapees may seek refuge. Latter activity cannot be construed to come under "Agreed Activities" and is recognized by working level of naval intelligence. Navy issued these instructions because of lack of any info that such assets have been or will be developed by CIA and felt it must go ahead on its own.

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Page 196:

"In the Far East all collectors in Korea, except CIA, are cooperating and the services have a control system for all of their operations. CIA contends that because of requirements of National Security Act of 1947 and Public Law 110 of 1949 it cannot cooperate."

This has to do with system of source control and IAC-D-54 dated July 24, 1952.

DEFECTION

Page 196:

All services have much complaint with CIA in failure of CIA to keep Inter-Agency Defectors Committee in Washington and field informed of defection until long after they had taken place. No complaint when procedures in accordance with existing directives are used.

E&Z

Page 197:

Long discussion on E&Z concerning Air Force and Navy - then -

CIA will not reveal assets in field of E&Z at this time. States it is unnecessary. Commander 6th Fleet got instructions in sealed envelope to be opened in time of war which would provide instructions for pilot briefings. CIA will not provide info to Navy crews participating in "overflights" -- CIA says why sacrifice all for one or two men. "This is the only firm indication available to the Navy at the Washington level of the possible existence of any CIA assets in this field."

CONCLUSION

Page 203:

"There is a need for the establishment of a control registry of clandestine agents in accordance with IAC Dir #54 in order to prevent duplication of payment and false confirmation or information. Action in this respect is being delayed due to Agency reluctance to disclose sources." (p. 196)

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"Either CIA has been unable to develop and maintain adequate assets in the E&E guerrilla warfare areas or is furnishing inadequate info to the services concerning its assets. Such a condition can only result in duplication of effort, inadequate planning and failure in operations." (pp. 183, 184, 189, 192-194, 201, 202.)

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Page 204&5: All concerning above, and

"That the NSC review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for E&E and support of guerrilla warfare.

ATOMIC ENERGY

Page 219: Conclusion

No one agency has primary responsibility for collection or production of info in their field.

Page 220: Recommendation:

"That the Central Intelligence Agency, in the exercise of its responsibilities for coordination of the production of national intelligence, pay special attention to the production of atomic energy intelligence."

III. COORDINATION IN OVERSEAS AREAS

Page 308:

"CIA generally has been the least cooperative Agency in these exchange matters and has aroused thereby the greatest dissatisfaction. It is appropriate to note that the CIA representatives apprised of their activities to the extent they are permitted to

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do so. However, because of the restrictions imposed on the use of this information by the recipient, its use is limited. In some areas a few military men were found who were of the opinion that CIA possessed assets and capabilities which, in fact, they did not have.

Page 309:

Conclusions:

The strong emphasis on security which gives rise to a high degree of compartmentation has an unfavorable impact on the exchange of information so vital to the effective operation of the intelligence function. The limitation imposed by CIA on its field representatives has aroused the greatest dissatisfaction.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Proposed Revisions of NSCID No. 5

REFERENCE: Department of the Navy draft, undated, headed National Security Council Directive No. 5

1. Reference was prepared by the Department of the Navy as an emendation of the CIA draft of a revised NSCID No. 5. It was submitted at the meeting of the IAC working group for NSCID No. 5, held on 24 July 1957.
2. In all important respects the deletions and additions proposed in reference are unacceptable. It is the purpose of this memorandum to point out the objections to reference as a whole as well as to major proposed changes.
3. The fundamental objection to reference is that its proposals are contrary to existing law. The primacy of the Director of Central Intelligence and, in certain respects, of the Central Intelligence Agency in matters of national intelligence and counterintelligence abroad is not merely recognized but stipulated in the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), and in further implementing directives of the National Security Council.
4. Were reference to be validated by all concerned, the effect would be to return the U. S. intelligence community to that condition of divided and co-equal rights and responsibilities which was injurious to U. S. interests in the period before 1947 and which made essential the passage of the National

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Security Act and the establishment of a central intelligence agency.

5. The revision of NSCID No. 5 proposed by the Central Intelligence Agency is based upon the existing NSC directive to the extent possible. It is unsound to attempt to base a revision solely upon the National Security Act itself, because that act is in the public domain, is not classified, and therefore cannot include provisions which concern the clandestine activities of the United States. The extant NSCID No. 5, and any revisions thereof, must be designed to meet a need which, by its nature, the National Security Act cannot meet.

6. The National Security Act distinguishes unmistakably between departmental intelligence (102 d (3)) and "intelligence affecting the national security". The latter is termed organized Federal espionage and counterespionage in the present NSCID No. 5. The proposed CIA revision refers to "all national espionage outside the United States...." Whatever the term, the intent of Congress and the National Security Council to differentiate between national and departmental intelligence and to assign primacy in the former to the Central Intelligence Agency is self-evident. This vital distinction has been blurred and rejected in the Navy's proposed version.

7. In the following sub-paragraphs no attempt has been made to deal with each change proposed by reference but rather to illustrate, by citing the most radical of the proposals, that reference stands in opposition to established law and the intent of Congress.

a. The intent of the present NSCID No. 5 is clearly stated. National (or Federal) intelligence and counterintelligence conducted abroad, as distinct from intelligence and counterintelligence activity designed for the primary benefit of a single Agency, are the province of the Central Intelligence Agency, which bears this responsibility as a service of common concern. The effect of a number of passages in reference, including paras. 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 12, would be to destroy this concept and make of the Central Intelligence Agency not a central national instrument but one among many duplicative and parallel bodies.

b. The proposal that there be a free exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence information, both raw and finished, is not workable. If put into effect, it would swamp the IAC member agencies with a flood of information, much of it highly sensitive, to the detriment of their efficiency and the national security. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by the National Security Act with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. A free exchange of raw intelligence would make it impossible for him to discharge this responsibility.

c. The definition of coordination proposed by para. 3c of reference is completely different from the sense of the National Security Act, Section 102 (d), which concerns "the purpose of coordinating the intelligence

activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security. The definition proposed by reference embraces inter-service relationships, not coordination.

d. It is noteworthy that Title I of the National Security Act is "Coordination for National Security -- Central Intelligence Agency".

Coordinating functions assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency were specifically allocated to the Director of Central Intelligence by the present NSCID No. 5. The effect of reference would be to charge him with insuring coordination (paras 6 and 7) without granting him the coordinator's central role.

e. Those provisions of the CIA draft which deal with liaison concern contact maintained by a U.S. Agency with a clandestine service to deal with clandestine matters. Within this realm the Director of Central Intelligence cannot discharge his responsibilities for coordination, the protection of sources and methods, and the national security unless he is given full and prior information by all concerned. If, as reference proposes, liaison activity were merely "coordinated" among the U.S. Agencies concerned, without a central point of reference, then confusion, competition, and security problems would inevitably result. This Agency has seen some

TOP SECRET

unfortunate results ensue when liaison approaches were made without coordination with the central point of reference.

8. The listing of the above objections does not mean that the remaining changes proposed by reference are acceptable. It is considered, rather, that these objections go to the heart of the matter and demonstrate that the position advocated by reference and the position of this Agency are not divergent but irreconcilably opposed and that therefore a point-by-point rebuttal of the position of the Department of the Navy would obscure the more fundamental objection to the entire frame of reference in which that position has been stated.

TS #141599
Copy No. 53
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Review of National Security Council Intelligence Directives

References: IAC-M-292, item 3; IAC-M-287, item 10

1. Attached is a draft revision of National Security Council Directive No. 5, prepared pursuant to a recommendation of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Because this draft constitutes such an extensive revision of the text of the present NSCID No. 5, the prior practice of submitting a draft in which the old language is lined out and the new language underlined has not been followed in this case.

2. Members of the IAC working group on revision of the NSCID's will be notified by General Truscott's office when a meeting will be held to discuss this proposed revision of NSCID No. 5 and prepare a coordinated draft for submission to the IAC.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Secretary

Document No. _____
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date: _____
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: 9-18-91
By: _____

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(b)(3)

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Approved for Release: 2019/09/18 C03124788

600455

TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

* 1. The Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct all national espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies.

2. The Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct all counter-intelligence outside the United States and its possessions, except that this authority shall not preclude the departmental counterintelligence activities, and certain agreed counterintelligence activities pertaining thereto, of other Departments and Agencies, necessary for the protection of their respective personnel, operations, installations, material, and equipment. Each Department or Agency with personnel or installations located outside the United States and its possessions is responsible for the counterintelligence protection of such personnel or installations.

Sec. 102 (d) of the NSC Act
Army #3
* The representatives of the Army, Navy and JIC reworded their position on this paragraph.

TOP SECRET

TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

3. For the purpose of this directive:

*Substitute
4. a. of
was draft*

a. Espionage is defined as the clandestine procurement of information.

intelligene

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that activity, with its resultant product, which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel and installations [abroad] against espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion. As an activity, counterintelligence is the process of producing, developing, and recording information concerning espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion directed against the national security, and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting, such acts.

draft

4. The Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for maintaining as a service of common concern the central indices and records of foreign counterintelligence information. It shall be the obligation of the Departments and Agencies to assist the Central Intelligence Agency in the execution of this responsibility by contributing to the central file, on a continuing basis, all pertinent material collected by them.

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TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

5. To promote the over-all interests of the U. S. intelligence community the Director of Central Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, coordinate all activities authorized herein except in active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged in combat, in which event the provisions of paragraph 12, below, shall apply.

6. The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate foreign clandestine intelligence collection with overt collection abroad. He shall also insure in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee that counterintelligence activity abroad is coordinated with the Departments and Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence to the extent necessary to insure conformity with the policies enunciated by the National Security Council. The Director of Central Intelligence shall invite Departments and Agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration.

7. Other Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing continuous

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

and timely guidance, specific collection requirements, and assessments of intelligence information collected.

8. In the conduct of national espionage and counterintelligence the Director of Central Intelligence shall make arrangements with the Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

9. In a foreign area other than an active theater of war where U. S. forces are engaged in combat, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. representative appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

10. In a foreign area where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders informed of the espionage and counterintelligence operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from the area in direct support of the commanders.

11. The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for the establishment, conduct, and development of liaison concerning clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security services.

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

Other Departments and Agencies may conduct liaison on non-clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security services as required for the proper execution of their missions. However, all liaison which concerns or affects clandestine matters shall be coordinated in advance and on a continuing basis with the Central Intelligence Agency in order to insure that such relationships are beneficial to the over-all clandestine interests of the U. S.

12. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged in combat:

a. All resources of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be included in a CIA Theater Force and, through the CIA commander thereof, shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations in accordance with the requirements of the U. S. Military Theater Commander or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Such exceptional espionage and counterintelligence operations as may be conducted by the CIA Theater Force in support of national requirements as distinguished from those operations conducted in support of the Military Theater

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #141599
IAC-D-105/5
9 July 1957
Draft

Commander shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison between U. S. military commanders and foreign services concerning clandestine matters.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved for Release: 2019/09/18 C03124788



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

Security Information

25 MAY 1953

G2-CD

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Inter-Agency Source Control (IAC-D54/1)

1. Reference is made to my memorandum of 13 March 1953 concerning the above subject.
2. As you will recall, on 1 May 1953, we discussed Inter-Agency Source Control and the relationship thereof to Agreed Activities. On this occasion it was mutually agreed that Agreed Activities formed the basis of approach on matters related thereto such as source control. Also, on this occasion I indicated my concurrence with the idea of returning the Source Control paper to a Working Group to resolve service differences of viewpoint.
3. In response to a call from Mr. Reber, I am forwarding this memorandum to officially record the modification of my position as indicated in my memorandum of 13 March 1953 to conform to our understanding arrived at in our conference of 1 May 1953.

A. C. ROBERTSON
Major General, USA
G-2, AFMAG

(ENCLOSURE DELETED) FILE

*agreed activities***SECRET**

Security Information

400004

4-1609

27 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

ATTENTION: Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]

(b)(1)

SUBJECT: Inter-agency Source Control

(b)(3)

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DD/P from undersigned dated
23 March 1953, subject as above

1. Referenced memorandum transmitted IAC Agency replies to IAC-D-54/1 (26 February 1953) and called attention (paragraph 3) to G-2's request for deferment of the source control project, pending completion of "agreed activities" negotiations.

2. Subsequently, Mr. Reber, after consulting with Colonel Carey, had discussions with General Willens. The DCI later talked with General Partridge with regard to which the latter has now transmitted a memorandum dated 25 May 1953 in which he states:

"I indicated my concurrence with the idea of returning the Source Control paper to a Working Group to resolve service differences of viewpoint."

In response to a call from Mr. Reber, I am forwarding this memorandum to officially record the modification of my position as indicated in my memorandum of 13 March 1953 to conform to our understanding arrived at in our [DCI and General Partridge] conference of 1 May 1953."

3. G-2 is now entirely willing to join in your working group discussions to produce a final agreed "Terms of Reference," which could be circulated as IAC-D-54/2 for IAC approval and designation of IAC Source Group members.

OIC:RDD: (26 May 1953)

RICHARD D. DRAHE

(b)(1)

Secretary

(b)(3)

Distribution:

Intelligence Advisory Committee

2 - DCI ✓

1 - OIC

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
27 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: ITEM FOR DCI LOG

REFERENCE: Memorandum from G-2, dated 25 May 1953,
subject: Inter-Agency Source Control
(IAC-D-54/1) (Attached)

General Partridge has modified his earlier position *with respect to* ~~respecting~~ continuing working group discussions of the source control problem; following his discussion of 1 May 1953 with the DCI on agreed activities, the G-2 now agrees to further working group efforts to resolve differences of viewpoints as to source control. DD/P has been informed by OIC.


RICHARD D. DRAIN
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Enclosure

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

7 January 1958MEMO FOR Colonel Lansdale

Mr. [] called me this date, stating that there would be an IAC meeting Director's Conference Room Admin Bldg, CIA, at 1045 on Tuesday, 21 Jan. to which this office is invited to send representation.

The purpose of this IAC meeting is to have what it is hoped will be a final discussion of the entire package of the NSCIDs.

Stewart

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

TOP SECRETFILE
25 Feb 58

NSCID No. 5 clearly establishes the primary responsibility of CIA for the conduct of U.S. espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad, while at the same time providing the necessary authority for the armed services to engage in such activities in support of their own requirements. Service participation in clandestine activities has long been recognized and welcomed by CIA. It was provided for in the original NSCID-5 by the somewhat vague term "agreed activities," which it was then necessary to define and expand in _____ which served as a corollary to the original NSCID 5. To the extent that the new NSC directive combines the provisions of the earlier NSCID-5 _____ with respect to Service espionage and counter-espionage activities, it should be viewed as neither undesirable diffusion of responsibility" or a retreat from the earlier version.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Date	23 DEC 1985
Declassify on	ONR
Reviewed by	REC MCT DIV. 213
Reason:	EO 12065, 1R, Para 202 dle

No OSD objection to
declassification
subject to CIA
concurrence.

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TS-1146



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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.FILE
NSCIDS

8 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

This office was not notified in any way by CIA of the specific time of the IAC meeting on 7 January, but was under the impression that it was to be held at 2:30 that date. Preparations were made to have OSO representation at this IAC meeting on NSCIDs 5, 13 and 14. In the case of NSCID 5, the only one of the three NSCIDs concerning which this office had any real change proposals to make, the undersigned had prepared some proposed changes, concurred in by all members of the OSO office (see attached comments on NSCID 5).

It was discovered around noon of the 7th that the IAC meeting had actually been held at 1045. A check with the Office of General Truscott, the CIA IAC Secretariat, and with [redacted] CIA coordinator for these NSCIDs, that this office had not been notified in any way of the time, and [redacted] had had this responsibility.

[redacted] apologized for his failure to notify this office of the time of the IAC meeting and agreed, after discussion with General Truscott, to include, based on the desire of DOD, the change proposed by this office in paragraph 2d contained in the attached OSO comments on revised draft of NSCID 5. Other proposed changes are, admittedly, not of sufficient importance to require IAC discussion.

The next IAC meeting, on 21 January, will include NSCID 5 and all the NSCIDs in final discussion as a "package."

[Signature]
MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USA

No OSD objection to
declassification

subject to CIA

concurrence.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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TS-1145

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

6 November 1957MEMO FOR THE RECORD

I telephoned [] CIA, re: results of the 5 November 1957 meeting of the IAC on NSCID 5 at which Mr. William Smith, OSO, was present and where certain members agreed to submit further position papers. [] said he gathered that Army (General Schow) and JIG (General Collins) were the only ones to submit such papers and that he would send these new views, as well as CIA's comments on them, to OSO for our own office coordination and comments prior to making any changes in a new draft of NSCID 5 for action by the IAC.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

MS7

MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USA

C-30214

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

25 October 1957MEMO FOR Colonel Lansdale

[redacted] CIA, telephoned me this morning and said that General Truscott wanted Colonels Lansdale and Stewart both to try to be present at the IAC meeting next Tuesday, 29 October (IAC conference room, first floor, CIA Administration Building) at 1045, when NSCID 5 is scheduled to be an early item on the agenda.

Objective is to arrive at tentative approval by the IAC on NSCID 5. After all NSCIDs have been approved and fully coordinated with each other by the IAC, then it is planned to ship all of these NSCIDs as a "package" to the NSC (objective date: January 1958) for final approval.

MATTHEW C. STEWART
Colonel, USA

28 OCT

[redacted] CALLED. ATC (IAC)

POSTPONED TO TUES, 5 NOV, 1957

MC

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

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COMMENTS ON REVISED DRAFT OF NSCID NO. 5, DATED 23 DECEMBER 1957

1. a. Rewritten but no objection.
b. No change.
2. a. No change.
b. No change.
c. No change.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3. The new statement, in first sentence is, in net effect, unchanged except must the "all" be retained?

- a. No change.
- b. No change.
- c. No change.
- d. Last sentence changed, but net effect the same.

No OSD objection to
declassificationsubject to CIA

concurrency.

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4. Entire paragraph unchanged.

5. Entire paragraph unchanged.

6. Entire paragraph unchanged.

7. The latter portion of last sentence, contained in the 14 October draft, was eliminated, which said, ". . . which significantly affect the missions of such commanders." This placed a clear obligation upon the commander to inform the CIA representative of his missions and, in turn, upon the CIA representative to inform the commander of anything which affected the latter's mission--nothing more or less. OSD would like this statement retained.

8. a. Changed but appears good.

b. No change.

c. No change.

9. a. Changed but no objection.

b. Changed but no objection.

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TOP SECRET

1. a. Rewritten but no objection.

b. No change.

2. a. No change.

b. No change.

c. No change.

d. The statement, proposed by OSO, OSD, which was in the 14 October draft, "Arrangements involving the military services or any component of the Department of Defense, will be made in accordance with the procedures established by the Secretary of Defense," was eliminated. OSO liked it included - who decided to take it out? says will leave in if OSD wants.)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

3. The new statement, in first sentence, is, in net effect, unchanged.

a. No change.

TOP SECRET

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- b. No change.
- c. No change
- d. Last sentence changed, but net effect the same.

4. Entire paragraph unchanged.

5. Entire paragraph unchanged.

6. Entire paragraph unchanged.

7. The latter portion of last sentence, contained in the 14 October draft, was eliminated, which said, ". . . which significantly affect the missions of such commanders." This placed a clear obligation upon the Commander to inform the CIA representative of his missions and, in turn, upon the CIA representative to inform the Commander of anything which affected the latter's mission--nothing more or less. OSD would like this statement retained.

8. a. Changed but appears good.

b. No change.

c. No change.

9. a. Changed but no objection.

b. Changed but no objection.

TOP SECRET

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8615
FILE NO. TS	DATE 23 Dec 57	NO. OF CYS. 1
C. R.		
C. R.		
REFERRED	Col. Lansdale Col. Stewart	
ISSUE DATE	27 Dec	SL
DUE DATE		
SUBJECT: Revision of NSCID No. 5		
<i>Please check this with Tordeella and Gen. E</i>		
SL		
RETURN RECEIPT		CONTROL REFERENCE
FORM SD - 59		

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-D-105/5
23 December 1957
Revised Draft


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Revision of NSCID No. 5

1. The attached revision of NSCID No. 5 incorporates the majority of the suggestions proposed by General Schow and General Collins. As no other comments were received from the Intelligence Community, it is believed that NSCID No. 5 is now ready for IAC approval.

2. Accordingly, this paper will be on the Intelligence Advisory Committee agenda on 7 January 1957.

JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

Attachment as stated

Copy No. 48 T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

8615

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T.

IAC-D-105/5

Revision of 9 July Draft
9 December 1957NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

Re-written
bd

a. Espionage is defined as that intelligence activity which is directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

Copy No. T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;

c. Invite departments and agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counter-intelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with other departments and agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinate the arrangements for cover support required by any other department or agency to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4. below, [except when such cover is to be provided unilaterally and without utilizing the facilities or becoming identified with other departments or agencies of the government or non-governmental organizations.]

} new

Copy No__T.S. 164904

- 2 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

3. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility ^{new} [for all U. S. clandestine activities.] Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, it is responsible for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all departments and agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services;

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counter-intelligence information. All departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, [such material ^{new} collected by them as is appropriate for a central file.]

e. Upon request and to the extent practicable, assisting other departments and agencies in connection with their cover support needs.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

a. Conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

- 3 -

Copy No. T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. Departments and agencies shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph 8 applies, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, insure that the senior U. S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In a foreign area where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders, or their designated representatives, appropriately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence ^{new} (activities and) operations, conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such areas, [including any liaison relationships between CIA and foreign military establishments.] ^{new}

Copy No. T.S. 164904

- 4 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

rewrite a. [Except as provided in ^{new} sub-paragraph b. below,] the entire Central Intelligence Agency organization [conducting espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations in or from a theater shall as a component force be under the direct command of the U. S. Theater Commander in accordance with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and] shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations. *new*

b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of some exceptional political, diplomatic or other implication, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested departments and agencies shall:

rewrite a. Develop appropriate policy recommendations for National Security Council consideration with respect to the overall U. S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions;

Copy No. T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T⁵

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

revised

b. To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the National Security Council, provide for the coordination of all types of U. S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad and for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the departments and agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.

- 6 -

Copy No__T.S. 164904

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8377
FILE NO. TS # 141642	DATE 14Oct57	NO. OF CYS. #48 w/1
C. R.		att
C. R.		
REFERRED	Col Lansdale Mr. Smith	Stewart
ISSUE DATE	18Oct57	17
DUE DATE		
SUBJECT: IAC-D-105/5 (Revised) Draft revision of NSCID No. 6		
RETURN RECEIPT		
FORM SD-59	CONTROL REFERENCE	

FROM: IAC		LOG NO. 8377
FILE NO. TS # 141642	ATE 14Oct57	NO. OF CYS. 448 w/1 att
C. R.		
C. R.		
REFERRED	Col Lansdale Mr. Smith	
ISSUE DATE	18Oct57	
DUE DATE		
SUBJECT: IAC-D-105/5 (Revised) Draft revision of NSCID No. 5		
RETURN RECEIPT		
FORM SD - 59		CONTROL REFERENCE

TS #141642

Copy No. 48

IAC-D-105/5 (Revised)

14 October 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Review of National Security Council Intelligence DirectivesReferences: IAC-M-292, item 3; IAC-M-287, item 10

Attached is a draft revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, which has been coordinated by the interagency working group established by the IAC for this purpose. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC for discussion and appropriate preliminary action on 29 October 1957.

Secretary

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(b)(3)

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TS #141642

IAC-D-105/5

Revision 9 July Draft

14 October 1957

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

a. Espionage is defined as ^{that intelligence} ~~those clandestine~~ activities which ^{is} ~~are~~ directed toward the acquisition of information through ^{clandestine} ~~intelli-~~gence operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

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a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;

c. Invite Departments and Agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinate arrangements for such cover support ^{required by any} ~~as may be required by~~ other Departments ^{or} ~~and~~

Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in

paragraph 4 below, ^{except when such cover is to be provided} ~~Arrangements for cover involving the~~ ^{unilaterally & w/o utilizing the facilities or becoming identified} ~~military services or any component of the Department of Defense~~

^{with other depts or agencies or non-governmental organizations.}

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will be made in accordance with the procedures established by the

Secretary of Defense.] MAY GET TIED OUT AS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR A DISCIP

3. The Central Intelligence Agency *has primary responsibility for* is the national clandestine *all U.S. clandestine activities* service of the United States and has primary responsibility,] subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, *it is responsible* for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information to which all Departments and Agencies shall contribute on a continuing basis *such material collected by them as is appropriate for a central file.* all pertinent material collected by them

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other Departments and Agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

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a. Conduct additional espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. They shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph 8 applies, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, insure that the senior U. S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In ⁱⁿ foreign areas where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders, or

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their designated representatives, appropriately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence ^{activities and} operations, conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such areas ^{including} which ^{any liaison relationship between CIA + foreign} significantly affect the missions of such commanders. ^{which} ^{inter est.} ^{which}

8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

Except as provided in sub para. b. below
 *a. ~~The entire Central Intelligence Agency organization assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence to a commander of a command established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be~~
conducting espionage & clandestine CI ops in or from -
Theatre shall as a component force be under the direct
command of the U.S. Theatre Commander in accordance with
agreements separately reached between the D.C.I. & the JCS, and
 shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations.

b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of some exceptional political, diplomatic or other implication, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State.

Foot [*Detailed arrangements concerning the command relationships between the CIA organization and the Armed Forces in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged are established by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested Departments and Agencies ^{out} [as provided in paragraph 2c above] shall:

a. *Develop appropriate policy recommendations for NSC consideration with respect to the overall U.S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the U.S. + its possessions.*
 Provide for coordination of all U. S. counterintelligence activities abroad and for the coordination of such activities with the Departments and Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence, to the extent necessary to ensure conformity with

policies enunciated by the National Security Council;

b. *To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the NSC, provide for the promotion of the overall effectiveness of the U. S. counterintelligence coordination of all types of U.S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad + for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the Depts + Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.*
 Take such other action as may be deemed necessary to promote the overall effectiveness of the U. S. counterintelligence coordination of all types of U.S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad + for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the Depts + Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

27 September 1957


MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Ad Hoc Working Group on NSCID #5

SUBJECT : Revised Draft of NSCID #5

1. The enclosed draft of NSCID #5 is the result of informal coordination with and contributions from the working level within the intelligence community; it is believed that we have achieved general agreement on its basic provisions.

2. There is also general agreement among those agencies operationally involved with the subject that detailed instructions for implementation of this NSCID #5 should be spelled out in one or more DCIDs, as may be necessary, the primary objective of the NSCID being to set forth the basic assignment of authority and responsibilities.

3. It is requested that the members of the ad hoc working group meet on 9 October 1957 at 2:15 P.M. in the DCI Conference Room (214 Administration Building) for a final group discussion of the paper with the objective of expediting the transmission of a coordinated draft to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.


L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret)
Deputy Director (Coordination)

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Enclosure

T.S. #164742
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Revision 9 July Draft
24 September 1957NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 5

U. S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. For the purpose of this directive:

a. Espionage is defined as those clandestine activities which are directed toward the acquisition of information through intelligence operations against a foreign power.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation, and its personnel, information and installations abroad, against espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversion. As an activity, counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable of conducting such activity.

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2. To ensure centralized direction and prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Establish, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination;

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the U. S. and its possessions, including liaison which concerns clandestine activities or which involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad;

c. Invite Departments and Agencies not permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee which have clandestine counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligence Advisory Committee deliberations when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration;

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with Departments and Agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinate arrangements for such cover support as may be required by other Departments and Agencies to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4 below.

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3. As the national clandestine service of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency shall have primary responsibility for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security;

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions;

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information to which all Departments and Agencies shall contribute on a continuing basis all pertinent material collection by them.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other Departments and Agencies with commands or installations located outside the U. S. and its possessions may:

a. Conduct additional espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

b. Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

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c. Conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or concerning the above clandestine activities with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. Departments and Agencies shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the information collected. They shall provide similar support to each other as required.

6. In a foreign area other than an active theater of war where U. S. forces are engaged, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. representative appropriately advised of U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or from the area.

7. In a foreign area where major U. S. military commands are stationed, the designated representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U. S. military commanders or their designated representatives, informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from the area which provide information of significant importance to the missions of such commanders.

8. In active theaters of war where U. S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

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*a. The entire Central Intelligence Agency organization assigned by the Director of Central Intelligence to a commander of a command established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be established as a CIA Force and, through the CIA Commander thereof, shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations.

b. Such exceptional espionage and counterintelligence operations which, because of delicate political or diplomatic implications, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

c. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U. S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other interested Departments and Agencies as provided in paragraph 2c above, shall:

* Detailed arrangements concerning the command relationships between the CIA organization and the Armed Forces in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged are established by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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a. Provide for adequate coordination of all U. S. counterintelligence activities abroad and for the coordination of such activities with the Departments and Agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence, to the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies enunciated by the National Security Council;

b. Take such other action as may be deemed necessary to promote the overall effectiveness of the U. S. counterintelligence effort abroad.

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